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Abstract— A modern vehicle contains many electronic 
control units (ECUs), which communicate with each other 
through the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to ensure 
vehicle safety and performance. Emerging Connected and 
Automated Vehicles (CAVs) will have more ECUs and 
coupling between them due to the vast array of additional 
sensors, advanced driving features (such as lane keeping 
and navigation) and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) 
connectivity. As a result, CAVs will have more 
vulnerabilities within the in-vehicle network. In this study, 
we develop a software defined networking (SDN) based in-
vehicle networking framework for security against false 
information attacks on CAN frames. We then created an 
attack model and attack datasets for false information 
attacks on brake-related ECUs in an SDN based in-vehicle 
network. We subsequently developed a machine-learning 
based false information attack/anomaly detection model for 
the real-time detection of anomalies within the in-vehicle 
network. Specifically, we utilized the concept of time-series 
classification and developed a Long Short-Term Memory 
(LSTM) based model that detects false information within 
the CAN data traffic. Additionally, based on our research, 
we highlighted policies for mitigating the effect of cyber-
attacks using the SDN framework. The SDN-based attack 
detection model can detect false information with an 
accuracy, precision and recall of 95%, 95% and 87%, 
respectively, while satisfying the real-time communication 
and computational requirements.  
 
Index Terms— False information attack, Software 
Defined Networking (SDN), Electronic Control Unit (ECU), 
Connected and Automated Vehicle (CAV), Controller Area 
Network (CAN), Machine learning, Long Short Term 
Memory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
oday’s vehicles contain many electronic control units 
(ECUs) that communicate with each other through the 
Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to ensure vehicle safety 
and performance [1]. Emerging Connected and Automated 
Vehicles (CAVs) will have more ECUs and coupling between 
them due to the vast array of additional sensors, advanced 
driving features (such as lane keeping and navigation) and 
Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) connectivity. The vehicle’s 
interface with the outside environment, such as WLAN network 
for V2X communication and Bluetooth for mobile 
communication networks [2], makes them much more open to 
the outside-vehicle environment, thus increasing the risk of 
attack upon vehicle computer systems and networks. It is now 
known that vehicle control is vulnerable to compromise from 
                                                        
 
over-the-air software updates containing malware in which 
attackers gain access to ECUs. The in-vehicle network is thus 
open to a variety of vulnerabilities that create an attractive target 
for attacks, particularly false information injection attacks, that 
threatened the motorist of the vehicle attacked and those around 
that vehicle [3].  
 A failure to detect false information attacks in real-time for 
safety-critical applications can cause traffic crashes, injuries, 
and death [4]-[5]. For example, during the braking process, if 
an attacker injects malicious messages, such as false 
longitudinal brake force (LBF) message into the CAN bus, the 
Anti-Lock Braking System (ABS) will fail, thus resulting in the 
wheel-lock phenomenon (i.e., an out-of-control vehicle) [2], 
[3]. Similarly, false information received by an in-vehicle 
electronic parking brakes (EPB) system can wrongly activate 
parking brakes, and false steering wheel input can trigger the 
electronic stability control (ESC) unit to activate the vehicle 
braking system. The messages in a CAN bus are also quite 
vulnerable to attack via eavesdropping [6]. Indeed, in one such 
remotely launched CAN bus attack, the attacker eavesdropped 
upon and corrupted the messages within a single car, thus 
triggering a recall of 1.4 million other vehicles [7].  
The Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm offers 
new techniques for network security through a separation of the 
control and data planes [8]. SDN offers greater flexibility and 
resource management to defend against cyber-attacks while 
minimizing network data traffic congestion. Specifically, it 
simplifies network management tasks in terms of dynamic flow 
control, has a network-wide visibility with the global controller, 
is network programmable and rests upon a simplified data plane 
[8]. This study is novel in that the authors undertake for the first 
time to develop an SDN-based framework designed for the 
detection and mitigation of real-time false information attack 
on the ECUs through the in-vehicle network. Also detailed in 
this paper is a novel attack dataset for false information attack 
on the CAN bus, a machine-learning based attack detection 
model for the attack dataset, and the creation of several attack 
mitigation policies. The SDN controller will push the mitigation 
policy to the OpenFlow switches to deploy the updated security 
policies [9].  
 Although cryptographic message authentication on received 
CAN frames are available to robustly prevent CAN bus 
message forgery, they require a significant amount of 
processing resources [10, 11]. They are also characterized by 
high message exchange latency, which sacrifices the CAN bus 
real-time processing and communication performance [12]. 
Statistical and machine learning (ML) methods require all 
possible types of CAN bus attack messages (with different 
value ranges and transmission behaviors) for training [13, 14]. 
In this study, we aim to detect false messages without such a 
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large training data set while ensuring a high detection accuracy. 
SDN helps with the deployment of a data-driven detection 
model and a real-time mitigation model on top of the network 
management aspects of SDN. 
The two major contributions of this study are as follows. We 
develop an attack model and create attack datasets for false 
information attacks on brake-related ECUs in an SDN based in-
vehicle network framework. We then develop a machine-
learning based false information attack/anomaly detection 
model for the real-time detection of anomalies within the in-
vehicle networks.  
We collect the dataset of raw CAN frames from the CAN bus 
of a vehicle, and pre-process that dataset to create a subset of 
CAN frames received by three ECUs related to braking 
actuation: ABS (Anti-lock Braking System), EPB (Electronic 
Parking Brake System) and ESC (Electronic Stability Control 
System). From this attack-free dataset, we generate an attack 
dataset containing false CAN frames generated by a fake 
malicious ECU node. We then develop an LSTM time series 
classification model using the dataset to identify anomalies or 
false information, and train the model offline using the attack 
dataset. We next use the Mininet [15] simulation platform in 
which we create an SDN-based in-vehicle network topology. 
Through our analyses, we evaluate the accuracy of the false 
information attack detection model. We create different LSTM 
model frameworks by tuning the hyper-parameters to obtain the 
best model for attack detection. We also use Mininet to evaluate 
performance of the SDN based in-vehicle network in terms of 
latency for communication as well as false information attack 
detection and mitigation. 
The outline of this paper is detailed as follows. A discussion 
of the attack detection model and SDN is described in Section 
II, the SDN-based in-vehicle network framework is detailed in 
Section III, the study assumptions are detailed in Section IV, 
and the correlation analysis of the attack-free data is detailed in 
Section V. In Section IV, the false information attack modeling 
and misbehavior scenarios are described. In Section VII a 
machine learning-based false information attack detection 
model is developed, followed by a system-level evaluation of 
the SDN-based framework in Section VIII. The false 
information attack detection strategy is detailed in Section IX 
followed by concluding remarks in Section X. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The in-vehicle communication, including the connections 
within an autonomous vehicle controller network (e.g., the 
connections between CAN bus and ECUs, the ECUs inter-
connections, the connections between ECUs and actuators, and 
internal sensors and actuators themselves), are vulnerable to 
attack. The connections between onboard computers, which 
include physical connections (e.g., Ethernet, USB to sensors, 
HMI and brought-in devices) and wireless connections (e.g., 
WiFi to other devices / interfaces) are also more vulnerable to 
attack. As such, much research has been undertaken to mitigate 
compromised ECU functionality that can occur from inputs 
from sensors and other ECUs [16]. The consequences of such 
acts are quite severe given that these compromised systems can 
cause the ECUs to perform dangerous operations (i.e., disabling 
brakes).  In the subsections below, the current state of research 
on the detection and mitigation of attacks on in-vehicle network 
and SDN-based network is described. 
A. Attack Detection  
Various countermeasures have been proposed to thwart 
possible ECU attacks. For example, Ao et al. constructed a 
sensor model to generate the interval of a given variable based 
on the sensor measurement and the error bound. If the sensor 
readings are not located at the interval, the sensor is considered 
attacked. However, this method has a relatively low attack 
detection accuracy. If the sensor that is attacked in turn modifies 
the sensor reading at a small level so that the modified sensor 
reading is still located within the value interval, this method will 
fail to detect the attack on a sensor. Park et al. [18] applied a 
system with multiple sensors to measure the same physical 
variable and used pairwise inconsistencies between sensor 
readings to detect malicious sensor attacks. Ivanov et al. [19] 
applied the fusion algorithm on multiple sensor measurements 
to estimate and compare the sensor value with sensor 
measurements to detect the attack on a sensor. Although they 
fused multiple sensor readings to determine the sensor value, 
they ignored the effects of the sensor measurement noise on 
sensor readings, which resulted in a low-level attack detection 
accuracy.  
A series of studies were also undertaken to detect CAN bus-
based attacks [20]-[22]. Moore et al. [20] designed a data-
driven anomaly detection algorithm to identify the signal arrival 
frequency as the feature of CAN frames for the detection of 
possible anomalies in the CAN bus. Hoppe et al. [21] proposed 
an anomaly-based intrusion detection algorithm to analyze the 
value and periodicity characteristics to detect attacks by noting 
any changes in those message characteristics. Cho et al. [22] 
extended a previous intrusion detection algorithm by 
integrating the clock behaviors of ECU transmitters and 
detected abnormal changes in the criteria to improve the 
detection efficiency. However, the ECU clock is affected 
greatly by some factors, such as operating temperature. 
Therefore, although of importance, the accuracy of these 
concepts in detecting CAN bus attacks was quite low, 
compounded by the fact that the emphasis was on detection, not 
mitigation. Moreover, ECUs can be hacked if over-the-air 
software updates are interrupted and malware is injected, which 
can enable remote access to any ECU. Then, the frequency of 
the CAN frame generation from a specific ECU will not change, 
only the data field will contain false/malicious data. This type 
of attack cannot be detected by detection methods that only rely 
on message frequency. Only methods that analyze the data field 
can detect an attack in this scenario. 
B. Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
SDN is an emerging technology that is now deemed a viable 
network security solution [8]. There are four advantages of 
implementing security solutions using SDN, which are 
summarized in Table I. First, the dynamic flow control 
mechanism allows the implementation of efficient flow-based 
detection and mitigation models. Second, the centralized 
controller allows the detection of network flooding and 
anomalies on a network level and subsequent global resource 
management. Third, network programmability allows the 
development of sophisticated and customized security 
measures. Finally, the separation of the data plane enhances the 
use of SDN in a security device and in the additional modules. 
Although SDN has been extensively used to implement 
network functions, only a few studies have been conducted to 
elucidate the security aspects of SDN, particularly the security 
of SDN and the security involving the use of SDN [8], [23]-[26]  
Halba and Mahmoudi [27] presented an SDN based framework 
to enable safety and interoperability of networks for exchanging 
data between in-vehicle Electronic Control Modules (ECUs), 
such as, ABS (Antilock Bricking System) and ESC (Electronic 
Stability Control). The key feature of the SDN-based 
framework is that it is independent of ECU technologies and 
protocols which ensures network interoperability between 
different ECUs. Thus, the security solutions developed by 
levering SDN can be deployed to any kind of in-vehicle 
network.  
 
TABLE I  
Overall summary of SDN features and their potential 
contributions to in-vehicle network security 
 
SDN feature Feature 
Description 
Security 
Benefit 
Roles 
Dynamic flow 
control 
Controlling 
(reroute, 
forward, 
drop) 
network 
flows 
dynamically 
Identify 
malicious or 
suspicious 
network 
flows and 
separate them 
from benign 
flows  
Prevention, 
Mitigation 
Network-wide 
visibility with 
centralized 
control 
Monitoring 
network 
status and 
flow 
information 
and 
managing 
globally 
Detect 
network 
flooding and 
network 
anomalies 
globally 
Detection, 
Mitigation 
Network 
programmability 
Programming 
network 
functions 
Develop 
advanced 
network 
security 
applications 
efficiently 
and 
effectively 
Detection, 
Mitigation 
Simplified data 
plane 
Separating 
control and 
data plane for 
simplification 
Modify data 
plane easily 
as a kind of 
security 
device and 
add new 
modules 
Detection, 
Prevention, 
Mitigation 
 
III. FRAMEWORK FOR SDN-BASED IN-VEHICLE NETWORK   
As discussed previously, modern vehicles and AVs contain 
many ECUs that are interconnected via the CAN bus, through 
which they broadcast and receive data at high frequencies for 
efficient vehicle operation and safety. However, SDN is 
superior to traditional networks in terms of providing dynamic 
flow control, centralized network-wide monitoring, network 
programmability and a simplified data plane. SDN can also 
improve in-vehicle network safety and security. Indeed, one 
proposed SDN-based framework has a fast link failure recovery 
while maintaining real-time capabilities [27]. In this study, we 
present a framework for SDN based in-vehicle network and 
investigated the security aspect of this network. Unlike previous 
studies emphasizing DoS, fuzzy and impersonation attacks on 
the in-vehicle network, here we investigate false information 
attack from a malicious ECU connected to the network. We 
develop a deep learning-based detection model within an SDN-
based in-vehicle network framework for detecting false 
information attack. We also develop an SDN-based mitigation 
strategy that uses information from the false information attack 
detection model to create mitigation strategies to halt the 
propagation of false information through the network.  
The SDN based in-vehicle network framework for false 
information detection and mitigation is shown in Figure 1. The 
white arrows represent the propagation of attack-free CAN 
frames, and the red arrow the propagation of false CAN frames. 
The OpenFlow switch is configured as a forwarding device to 
forward all data frames to other ECUs regardless of the 
information within the data frames. It also communicates with 
the SDN controller through the OpenFlow protocol, allowing 
the SDN controller to perform network-wide monitoring. The 
SDN controller can push updated routing tables to the 
OpenFlow switch in real-time, allowing it to re-configure the 
network. As such, the SDN controller acts as the operating 
system of the data layer. The controller is connected with the 
application layer through an API, and the application layer 
contains all the additional capabilities required for the network.  
Three applications characterize this framework: simple 
switch, false information attack detection and attack mitigation. 
The simple-switch program configures the OpenFlow switch to 
function as a simple switch that forwards the incoming data 
frames to all other ECUs connected to it. The false information 
attack detection model investigates the data frames flowing 
through the OpenFlow switch to identify if there are some 
abnormalities or anomalies within the data. The detection 
model is trained offline because the training phase is time-
consuming, however the detection phase is real-time. The 
output of this model is the input to the attack mitigation model. 
The purpose of this model is to stop the propagation of false 
information through the network. 
The basic SDN framework consists of the data, control and 
application layers. The data layer consists of the ECUs and the 
OpenFlow switches. In order to show the communication 
between different ECUs effectively, five ECUs are chosen. The 
sixth ECU is actually not part of the vehicle system but rather a 
malicious ECU that has connected to the in-vehicle network. 
ESC, ABS and EPB are brake-related ECUs. We are interested 
in investigating the CAN frames which are received by these 
ECUs. Therefore, we have considered two other ECUs, EMS 
and MDPS, in this framework. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. SDN based in-vehicle network framework. 
 
The actual vehicle network is an extension of this framework. 
Instead of communicating through CAN bus, the ECUs will 
communicate through an Ethernet network. A time-triggered 
Ethernet should be used to meet the real-time requirements of 
the vehicle network. Each ECU connects to a universal adapter, 
which can be termed as a legacy in-vehicle network (LIVN) to 
IP adapter. The function of the universal adapter is to re-pack 
the CAN frames into Ethernet frames and vice-versa. The LIVN 
to IP adapter extracts the CAN frames from the transmitted / 
received data, which contain Ethernet headers, Internet Protocol 
(IP) headers, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) headers, 
CAN headers, and associated metadata [27]. One OpenFlow 
switch is connected to five ECUs. These OpenFlow switches, 
which merely forward data without any intelligence, receive 
and send data frames to ECUs using the LIVN to IP adapter.  
The integration of the SDN-based in-vehicle network with an 
Ethernet backbone and CAN frames is an important part of this 
framework. The CAN frames have a specific format, which is 
not changed. The CAN frames have a specific format 
containing CAN ID, DLC (number of bytes in the data), DATA 
and Timestamp fields. Although the backbone is Ethernet, the 
functionality of the CAN bus is also retained in this framework. 
Using the simple switch algorithm in the SDN application layer, 
the OpenFlow switch ensures that data frames coming from one 
ECU is forwarded to all other ECUs in real-time. This 
framework offers the additional advantage of monitoring 
data frames, detecting false information attacks and 
updating flow tables of the OpenFlow switch to mitigate the 
attack in real-time.   
IV. ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY  
In this section, we detail our five assumptions of the study 
prior to our description of the analysis, each of which is 
described below. 
Assumption 1: A subset of the in-vehicle network is considered 
to explain the proposed framework effectively. 
Assumption 2: The training for the deep learning-based attack 
detection model occurs offline. The SDN application layer 
contains the application, which directly predicts the attack 
status based on data from incoming frames. 
Assumption 3: The ECUs receive data from different sensors 
within a vehicle, with the assumption that such data may 
contain inaccuracies or noise. However, since we found no data 
related to the sensor noise, these inaccuracies are not 
considered. The analog-to-digital conversion (converting from 
raw bytes to actual signal values and vice versa) step may 
introduce some data errors, which are also considered in this 
analysis. 
Assumption 4: A threshold of 0.7 is used to define the 
correlation among the features. If two features have an absolute 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient greater than 0.7, then they are 
considered correlated. The threshold of 0.7 is selected based on 
a qualitative analysis of the dataset. 
Assumption 5: Each CAN frame has multiple signal values 
(values from multiple sensor readings) embedded within the 
data field. When the attack dataset is created from the attack-
free dataset, only one signal value is manipulated at a specific 
timestamp, with the other signal values of the data remaining 
unchanged. This means that only the specific bits or bytes of the 
data are changed. 
V. DATA DESCRIPTION  
A. Description of Attack Free Data 
To show the efficacy of our developed SDN-based 
framework for in-vehicle security, we use the data from real in-
vehicle CAN bus. Although other communication protocols, 
such as FlexRay, are available for the in-vehicle 
communication network, CAN is a universal and real-time 
messaging protocol in use in the automotive industry because 
of its lower implementation costs compared to FlexRay [28], 
[29]. CAN is a broadcast-based network where every ECU can 
listen to the content of the CAN bus, thus making the bus 
vulnerable to attacks. After acquiring the CAN bus, the attacker 
accesses the CAN data frame content. The existing CAN bus 
dataset shows that the acquisition of the CAN data frame makes 
it possible to create a Denial of Service (DoS) atack, fuzzy 
attack and impersonation attack on the CAN bus [29]. The CAN 
bus data used in this study were collected from the authors’ 
previous study on CAN intrusion. The dataset, which was actual 
CAN data from a KIA soul, was collected by the Hacking and 
Countermeasure Research Lab [29]. The raw CAN dataset, 
which contains 537 seconds of data, and 1,048,576 rows of 
CAN frames, is decoded using a generic DBC file for KIA 
vehicles. This DBC file is collected from the OpenDBC 
repository of DBC files created by CommaAI. As shown in 
Figure 2, the dataset contains the CAN ID, DLC (number of 
bytes in the data), DATA and Timestamp fields.      
The DBC file contains the scale and offset values to convert 
the raw bits of data into signal values. Each CAN frame 
contains values of different sensor readings, known as signals. 
The formula used for the conversion is given in Equation 1. 
[Scaled Data Value] = [Offset] + [Scale] x [Raw Decimal 
Data Value]                                                                                     (1)
 TABLE II 
Features used in the attack detection model 
Feature No. Message Name Code (dec) Signal Bits Range Min Range Max Scale Offset Correlations Max Deviation 
1 EMS11 790 TQI_COR_STAT bit 4-5 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 2,4,10,11,14,15 0.38 
2 EMS11 790 TQI_ACOR bit 8-15 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 1,4,10,11,13,14,15 0.13 
3 EMS11 790 N bit 16-31 0.00 16383.75 0.25 0.00 5,6,10,11,16 0.06 
4 EMS11 790 TQI bit 32-39 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 1,2,10,11,13,14,15 0.13 
5 EMS11 790 TQFR bit 40-47 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 3,6,16 0.06 
6 EMS11 790 VS bit 48-55 0.00 254.00 1.00 0.00 3,5,16 0.30 
7 EMS12 809 MUL_CODE bit 6-7 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 None 0.54 
8 EMS12 809 TEMP_ENG bit 8-15 -48.00 143.25 0.75 -48.00 None 0.03 
9 EMS12 809 BRAKE_ACT bit 32-33 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00 None 0.37 
10 EMS12 809 TPS bit 40-47 -15.02 104.69 0.47 -15.02 1,2,3,4,11,14,15 0.10 
11 EMS12 809 PV_AV_CAN bit 48-55 0.00 99.60 0.39 0.00 1,2,3,4,10,14,15 0.06 
12 EMS14 1349 VB bit 24-31 0.00 25.90 0.10 0.00 None 0.03 
13 EMS16 608 TQI_MIN bit 0-7 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 2,4,14,15 0.11 
14 EMS16 608 TQI bit 8-15 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 1,2,4,10,11,13,15 0.13 
15 EMS16 608 TQI_TARGET bit 16-23 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 1,2,4,10,11,13,14 0.13 
16 EMS16 608 TQI_MAX bit 40-47 0.00 99.61 0.39 0.00 3,5,6 0.07 
17 SAS11 688 SAS_ANGLE bit 0-15 -3276.80 3276.80 0.10 0.00 None 0.02 
18 SAS11 688 SAS_SPEED bit 16-23 0.00 1016.00 4.00 0.00 None 0.74 
19 SAS11 688 MSGCOUNT bit 32-35 0.00 15.00 1.00 0.00 20 0.45 
20 SAS11 688 CHECKSUM bit 36-39 0.00 15.00 1.00 0.00 19 0.45 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Sample CAN bus raw dataset 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Generic DBC file for KIA Soul showing the decoding information for message ID 1984, 1456, 1441 and 1440. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Correlation map of the feature set. 
The dataset is shown in Figure 2, and the DBC file is shown 
in Figure 3. Note in Figure 3 that each CAN ID has a specific 
ECU associated with it, which is the origin of the CAN frame. 
Under each frame, there are multiple signals, each of which has 
its own specific decoding information (i.e. scale, offset and 
range). The ECUs which receive and use these signal values are 
also mentioned here. The EMS and MDPS ECUs send CAN 
frames to the brake related ECUs: ABS, EPB and ESC. These 
CAN frames, which contain readings from different in-vehicle 
sensors, are also received by the malicious ECU.  
The malicious ECU then manipulates and forwards specific 
bits within the data field to the brake-related ECUs. As a result, 
the brake-related ECUs receive both the correct- and false-
information signal values that are used in the attack detection 
model. Information on these features is summarized in Table II, 
which also contains the decoded information from the DBC file 
for the specific signals we consider in this analysis. The signals 
have been selected based on its reception by the brake related 
ECUs. In addition, it contains values such as scale, offset, range 
and correlation information for each signal. The correlation 
column specifies the other signals which are correlated to it. 
The details about the correlation analysis are described in the 
next subsection.  
B. Correlation Analysis of Attack Free Data 
Prior to creating the attack dataset and the detection model, 
we performed a correlation analysis among the feature set from 
Table II. The correlation between these signal values is 
important for the detection of false information. If the value of 
one feature changes, other feature values should also change if 
they are correlated. However, when there is an attack, other 
feature values remain unchanged making it possible for the 
detection model to detect a false information attack. The 
correlation among the variables has been included in Table II. 
Let us consider the feature TQFR, a signal that is correlated 
with the N, VS and TQI_MAX signals. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is used to determine the correlation, with the color-
coded coefficient values shown in Figure 4. The yellow color 
indicates a strong positive correlation, and the dark blue color 
indicates a strong negative correlation between the variables. 
For example, the correlation of TQFR with N, VS and 
TQI_MAX are -0.80, -0.77, and -0.84 respectively, which 
indicates a strong negative correlation. 
 
VI. ATTACK MODELING AND MISBEHAVIOR SCENARIOS 
In this section, we describe the false information attack 
modeling for the in-vehicle CAN networks and the attack 
scenarios for false information attack that we have used in our 
study. We first begin with the existing dataset and create an 
attack dataset based on the false information attacker’s model 
and misbehavior scenarios. 
A. Attack Model 
After acquiring the CAN bus access, an attacker creates a 
virtual ECU and injects false information within the CAN 
network. In this context, an attacker acts as a legitimate ECU 
and injects false CAN frames within the CAN bus. This 
injection of CAN frames can jeopardize the other depended 
ECUs, which use the frames injected by the ECU created by an 
attacker. For example, the CAN frame with the CAN ID 316 
contains the information of the braking status which is then 
used by the ABS ECU. The attacker first obtains the 
information of the dependency between the ECUs and then 
carefully crafts false information that is injected into the CAN 
bus. Using a real-world dataset of Kia Soul vehicle, we obtain 
the dependency of the ECU by observing the CAN data 
communication between the ECUs. As shown in Figure 5, the 
ECU named EMS11 is characterized by a dependency on 
EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16. Thus, an attacker changing the 
EMS11 data field affects the EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16 
fields. A CAN data frame contains the 8-byte data field where 
an attacker only changes the values of the following bytes (see 
Table III). 
B. Misbehavior Scenarios 
We have created 11 false information attack scenarios based 
on the dataset as shown in Table III. For each signal information 
(11 signals in total) in Table III, we created a false information 
attack with a duration of 10 seconds for each signal. Our dataset 
contains the Kia Soul CAN bus data for a period of 537 seconds 
where there exist 1,048,576 CAN data frame from all ECUs. Of 
this dataset of 537 seconds, the dataset is divided into two sets: 
training dataset and testing dataset.  Among all these ECUs 
data, we consider only the data from the EMS11, EMS12, 
EMS14, and EMS16 as they are related to the breaking and 
engine control systems.  
 
 
 
An attacker can change the original data with a garbage value 
randomly with a value from outside the bound of the normal 
values. We first analyze the data to select the range of normal 
behavior from an ECU and generate a random value which is 
outside of the three standard deviations of the mean of the error 
(see Equation 2).  
 
ܦ௙௔௟௦௘ =  ܦ௢௥௢௚௜௡௔௟ ±  ߜ;                                                        (2) 
 
ݓℎ݁ݎ݁  |ߜ| ≥ 3ߪ,  ܦ௠௜௡ = ܦ௢௥௢௚௜௡௔௟ −  3ߪ,ܽ݊݀   ܦ௠௔௫ = ܦ௢௥௢௚௜௡௔௟ +  3ߪ 
 
where, ܦ௙௔௟௦௘  is the false information that is generated by the 
attacker; ܦ௢௥௢௚௜௡௔௟  is the actual value of a signal; ߜ is the added 
value to make ܦ௙௔௟௦௘  out of the normal distribution of a signal 
value; ߪ is the standard deviation or error bound of a signal 
value;  ܦ௠௜௡  and ܦ௠௔௫ are the minimum and maximum value 
possible value for a signal. To craft the attack data, an attacker 
creates false information data at ten-second intervals and only 
changes specific bytes within that 10 seconds. For the testing 
Fig. 5. CAN ECUs dependency on other ECUS on the same CAN bus. 
dataset, this attacker time is limited to 5 seconds. Figure 6 
shows an example of the false data injection of the 6th byte of 
EMS12 ECU from the time interval of 110 seconds to 120 
seconds. Within this timeframe the value of the 6th byte of 
EMS12, which contains the TPS signal information, was 
randomly selected having  ܦ௠௜௡ = 0 ,  ܦ௠௔௫ = 600 , and ߪ =0.03.  
 
TABLE III 
False information attackers changed bytes of ECUs 
 
CAN ID 
Position of 
bytes 
affected 
Signal name Misbehavior 
scenarios 
EMS11 
2 TQI_ACOR 1 
3, 4 N 2 
6 TQFR 3 
7 VS 4 
EMS12 
6 TPS 5 
7 PV_AV_CAN 6 
EMS14 4 VB 7 
EMS16 
1 TQI_MIN  8 
2 TQI 9 
3 TQI_TARGET 10 
6 TQI_MAX 11 
  
The attacker then replaces a particular byte of a CAN frame as 
shown in Table III.  
VII. MACHINE LEARNING BASED ATTACK DETECTION MODEL  
The data-driven attack detection model will be in the SDN 
application layer. The model will be pre-trained with the attack 
dataset. While the system is running, it will detect, in real time, 
the occurrence of an attack. The training of the model will occur 
offline. In this section, we describe the offline aspects of the 
model, including model development, training and offline 
testing. As detailed in the previous section, we use 20 signals as 
input features to the attack detection model. Each input feature 
is a time series and the different input features also have some 
correlation with each other. However, the output of the attack 
detection model should be a binary value that indicates the 
current attack status (attack / no attack). Therefore, in this study, 
we investigate a machine learning based time series 
classification model. The model architecture is shown in Figure 
7. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Attack on TPS Signal of EMS12 ECU. 
 
A. Model Architecture 
The first layer of the model is the LSTM layer, which 
contains multiple LSTM neurons. Compared to the simple 
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) neurons, the LSTM neuron 
has some additional operations that solve the vanishing gradient 
problem. Its primary feature is the cell state, also known as the 
memory, which keeps track of the previous timesteps of a time 
series. This feature is of particular importance here, as the 
variations in the input feature have some patterns that are 
captured by the LSTM neurons. The model can thus detect 
abnormalities in the input features. The LSTM layer will 
contain many LSTM neurons, the number of which is initially 
unknown. The number of neurons in the LSTM layer is one of 
the hyperparameters of the model, which will be described later. 
 
 
Fig. 7. False information attack detection model architecture. 
After the LSTM layer comes the fully connected (FC) layer, 
with the number of neurons in this layer also a hyperparameter. 
As the output from all the LSTM neurons is received by each 
neuron in this layer, the output of each neuron is a linear 
combination of the LSTM outputs. The activation function for 
this layer is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) function, which 
ensures that there are no negative outputs from any neuron. The 
link between the LSTM layer and the FC layer contains a 
dropout probability, which means that the weights of some links 
will be randomly set to 0. Dropout can reduce overfitting issues 
of the model. The value of the dropout probability is also a 
hyper-parameter of the model.  
The final layer is the output layer, which contains only a 
single neuron. This output of this neuron is binary values of 
either 0 (no attack) or 1 (attack). The activation function for this 
neuron is the “sigmoid” function, which is the standard 
activation function for binary classification. The loss function 
of the model is the binary cross entropy function and the 
optimizer used is the Adam optimizer. The formula for binary 
cross entropy is given in equation 3. Here, H denotes the 
entropy (loss) value, yi is the binary output and P(yi) is the 
predicted probability of that output. From the equation, it is 
evident that a correct prediction would result in a value of 0 and 
an incorrect prediction would result in infinite loss. 
ܪ = − 1ܰ + ෍൫ݕ௜ log൫P(ݕ௜)൯ே
௜ୀଵ + (1 − ݕ௜) log൫1− P(ݕ௜)൯൯       (3) 
 
The measures of effectiveness considered in this analysis are 
three standard measures for binary classification: accuracy, 
precision and recall.  
B. Training and testing 
The attack dataset described in the previous section has 500 
seconds of data with 2,369,868 rows of CAN frames. At first, 
we extract a subset of the dataset containing only the CAN 
frames EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, EMS16 and SAS11. This 
subset of the attack data contains 268,645 rows of data. The 
dataset is divided into the training set and the testing set. The 
training set contains data from 0-350 seconds, and the testing 
set contains the data from 350-500 seconds. In terms of rows, 
the training set contains 173,914 rows of data, and the testing 
set contains 94,731 rows of data. The input features in the 
training and testing set is normalized between 0 and 1 using 
min-max normalization. As the output is binary, normalization 
is not required.  
 
TABLE IV 
Hyperparameter tuning 
Hyperparameter Values for tuning 
Number of neurons in LSTM and FC layer 50, 100 
Number of epochs 50, 200, 500 
Batch size 32, 128, 512, 1024 
Dropout probability 0, 0.5 
 
C. Hyperparameter tuning 
The model has multiple hyperparameters that require tuning 
to identify the model with the highest accuracy. In this study, 
four hyperparameters and their values used for tuning are listed 
in Table IV. 
    For each hyperparameter combination, we train the model 
and generate the results in terms of accuracy, precision and 
recall. The results are summarized using Table V and Table VI. 
The results in Tables V and VI correspond to the dropout 
probabilities of 0 and 0.5, respectively.  
 
TABLE V 
Accuracy, Precision and Recall for Dropout = 0 
Number 
of 
Neurons 
Epochs Batch Size Accuracy Precision Recall 
50 50 32 0.89 0.78 0.92 
50 50 128 0.88 0.75 0.93 
50 50 512 0.94 0.94 0.89 
50 50 1024 0.93 0.89 0.89 
50 200 32 0.82 0.65 0.91 
50 200 128 0.88 0.76 0.92 
50 200 512 0.83 0.66 0.94 
50 200 1024 0.89 0.78 0.91 
50 500 32 0.81 0.63 0.94 
50 500 128 0.87 0.73 0.92 
50 500 512 0.81 0.64 0.93 
50 500 1024 0.83 0.67 0.93 
100 50 32 0.91 0.83 0.90 
100 50 128 0.90 0.79 0.93 
100 50 512 0.91 0.84 0.90 
100 50 1024 0.92 0.86 0.90 
100 200 32 0.86 0.71 0.92 
100 200 128 0.86 0.72 0.93 
100 200 512 0.85 0.70 0.90 
100 200 1024 0.86 0.72 0.93 
100 500 32 0.82 0.65 0.94 
100 500 128 0.87 0.73 0.93 
100 500 512 0.87 0.73 0.92 
100 500 1024 0.88 0.75 0.92 
 
Note that the 50-neuron, 50-epoch and 512-batch size model 
in Table V is the most accurate and the most precise (at 94%). 
This precision is also known as the positive predictive value, 
thus indicating an attack prediction accuracy rate of 94% 
accurate, and a false positive rate of 2.45%. Unfortunately, this 
model has a relatively lower recall score, also known as a true 
positive rate. This means that this model has a higher 
percentage of false negatives compared to true positives (11%) 
than the other models. The highest recall achieved with other 
models is 94%. 
Note, as indicate in Table VI, that the use of the dropout 
increases the accuracy of the detection model. The best model 
includes 50 neurons, 50 epochs and a batch size of 128, with an 
achieved accuracy and precision score of 95%, and a false 
positive rate of 2.11%. On the other hand, this model has a 
relatively lower recall score, which means that this model has a 
higher percentage of false negatives compared to true positives 
(13%) than the other models. The highest recall achieved with 
other models is 92%. 
 
TABLE VI 
Accuracy, Precision and Recall for Dropout = 0.5 
Number 
of 
Neurons 
Epochs Batch Size Accuracy Precision Recall 
50 50 32 0.93 0.90 0.89 
50 50 128 0.95 0.95 0.87 
50 50 512 0.94 0.93 0.88 
50 50 1024 0.94 0.95 0.87 
50 200 32 0.93 0.88 0.90 
50 200 128 0.93 0.87 0.90 
50 200 512 0.94 0.90 0.90 
50 200 1024 0.93 0.90 0.89 
50 500 32 0.93 0.89 0.90 
50 500 128 0.93 0.88 0.89 
50 500 512 0.92 0.85 0.90 
50 500 1024 0.94 0.91 0.89 
100 50 32 0.93 0.88 0.89 
100 50 128 0.92 0.86 0.90 
100 50 512 0.93 0.91 0.88 
100 50 1024 0.94 0.94 0.87 
100 200 32 0.93 0.87 0.90 
100 200 128 0.92 0.85 0.90 
100 200 512 0.92 0.85 0.90 
100 200 1024 0.93 0.86 0.91 
100 500 32 0.92 0.85 0.90 
100 500 128 0.88 0.76 0.92 
100 500 512 0.92 0.86 0.90 
100 500 1024 0.93 0.87 0.90 
 
VIII. SYSTEM EVALUATION 
We use a Linux virtual machine containing Ryu SDN 
controller to create our network topology [30]. As Ryu is a 
Python-based SDN controller, all hosts and switches are 
capable of executing python scripts. Therefore, we create a 
Python script for broadcasting and receiving CAN frames, and 
for measuring the overall communication latency. 
First, we segment the attack dataset to create a separate 
dataset for each ECU (hosted in Mininet). We consider in this 
analysis six ECUs (EMS, ABS, ESC, MDPS, EPB and a 
malicious ECU), and five CAN frame types (EMS11, EMS12, 
EMS14, EMS16 and SAS11) associated with these six ECUs. 
EMS is solely responsible for broadcasting EMS11, EMS12, 
EMS14 and EMS16 frames. MDPS is responsible for 
broadcasting SAS11 frames. It is assumed that the malicious 
ECU also broadcasts all the frames, because it receives all of 
the data frames forwarded by the OpenFlow switch.  The other 
three ECUs only receive these CAN frames from EMS and 
MDPS. This is a simple scenario in which we consider only a 
subset of ECUs from the overall in-vehicle CAN 
communication system. The refresh rate of each type of CAN 
frame is calculated from the attack dataset from the timestamps. 
The refresh rate of all five CAN frame types considered in our 
attack study is 100 Hz (i.e., 100 frames/seconds).   
CAN frames can be sent sporadically or periodically. 
Sporadic messages usually have a higher priority and must be 
sent as soon as a specific event occurs to maintain real-time 
operation [31]. Periodic messages, however, have a lower 
priority and sometimes encounter delays due to the higher 
priority traffic in the CAN bus. In this study, all the CAN frames 
under investigation have a 100 Hz (i.e., 100 frames/seconds) 
refresh rate. According to the SAE standards, the latency for 
each periodic message should be less than or equal to its refresh 
rate, in order to maintain real-time operation [31]. Therefore, 
here we establish an overall system latency requirement of 
less than 10 ms, corresponding to the 100 Hz refresh rate.  
As indicated in the system-level performance results in Table 
VII the average latency at which ABS, EPB and ESC receives 
the frames is 5.91 ms. The data frames are sent from the EMS, 
MDPS and the malicious ECU at 10 ms intervals. The time was 
recorded when the first frame was sent from these three ECUs. 
On the receiver side, the time was recorded when all the frames 
were received by all three ECUs (ABS, ESC and EPB). The 
difference between these two timestamps gives us the total time 
for receiving all frames. The total transmission time is also 
recorded on the sender side when all the frames have been sent 
to the receivers. The difference between these two times gives 
us the average communication delay, assuming that there is no 
queuing delay. Note although that the latency requirement is 
10ms for all message types, as listed in Table VII, the average 
latency is below that value. The maximum latency observed is 
6.05 ms for message type EMS12. 
In order to detect the false information in real time, the 
detection model must predict within this 10 ms timeframe. We 
trained and tested the detection model in a Nvidia GeForce 
GTX 1060 GPU with 3BG memory, after which the model was 
saved as a JSON file and the model weights were saved as an 
H5 file. Both the model and its weights were subsequently 
loaded into the memory and the 50 iterations of the testing times 
recorded for the same sample point. The average computation 
time for testing was 1.43 ms, and the average combined latency 
(communication latency and the computational latency) was 
7.34 ms, which is still below the 10 ms threshold. As such, the 
SDN based in-vehicle framework satisfies the real-time 
requirements in terms of communication and detection. 
Compared to the CAN bus, this is a major advantage, since the 
delay can vary significantly based on message priority and data 
traffic on the bus. The SDN-based in-vehicle network can 
avoid these additional delays in the communication among 
different ECUs and in the detection of false information 
within the network, thus meeting the real-time system 
requirements. 
 
IX. SDN-BASED FALSE INFORMATION ATTACK 
MITIGATION STRATEGY 
The SDN application layer contains the deep learning-based 
attack detection model. For each data frame flowing through the 
OpenFlow switch, first, the attack detection model will detect 
and provide the attack status to the mitigation model. Upon 
receiving the attack status information, the attack mitigation 
model parses the CAN frames to identify the false information 
source (malicious ECU) by extracting the CAN ID that has false 
information. It then requests the SDN controller for an updated 
flow rule to update the flow tables of the OpenFlow switch. For 
example, in the presence of a false information attack, the SDN 
controller creates an updated flow table, instructed by the attack 
mitigation model. Here, the OpenFlow switch does forward 
data frames from the malicious ECU to other legitimate ECUs, 
thus halting the propagation of false information through the 
network. In legacy in-vehicle networks (i.e., CAN bus), all 
ECUs are connected by a common data bus in which they all 
receive data frames from that bus, which does not prevent the 
propagation of false information. However, in our developed 
framework, SDN-based in-vehicle network offers the 
advantage of real-time attack mitigation by halting this false 
information propagation from the malicious ECU within the in-
vehicle network. In Figure 8, we provide our exemplar of the 
mitigation model. 
 
 
Fig. 8. SDN-based false information attack mitigation strategy. 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we investigated the vulnerability of an SDN 
based in-vehicle network to a false information attack. We 
began by collecting a dataset and creating an attack model to 
launch false information attacks on brake-related ECUs. We 
then developed a machine-learning based false information 
attack/anomaly detection model that detects, in real time, any 
anomalies within the in-vehicle networks. The model 
framework was developed based on LSTM based time series 
classification concept. We also evaluated the accuracy of SDN 
framework in terms of detection and latency in terms of 
communication and computation. Our analyses indicate a 95% 
success in determining the false information attacks in real-
time. We also investigated the overall network/system 
performance in terms of computation time for detection and 
overall latency. Results indicate that our SDN-based in-vehicle 
network detection model successfully detected false 
information in real-time, meeting the latency requirement for 
communication. 
While CAN and FlexRay are the most popular technologies 
for in-vehicle networks, emerging Ethernet technology related 
to in-vehicle networks may well replace them. SDN is well 
aligned with the Ethernet technology, making it a potential tool 
for the future in-vehicle network. However, research is required 
to identify the advantages and limitations of this novel SDN-
based in-vehicle network concept in emerging in-vehicle 
networks. This study will provide support in developing new 
standards for SDN-based in-vehicle networks and 
designing/developing robust SDN topologies and machine-
learning based attack detection/mitigation models for in-vehicle 
networks. 
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